TEXTS
The fundamental methodological fact that historical linguists have to face is that they have no control over their data. Texts are produced by a series of historical accidents; amateurs may complain about this predicament, but the sophisticated historian is grateful that anything has survived at all. The great art of the historical linguist is to make the best of this bad data -'bad" in the sense that it may be fragmentary, corrupted, or many times removed from the actual productions of native speakers. He relies first of all on the canons of critical scholarship -by-laws and safeguards against human fallibility and corruptibility. The most important of these is reference -the act of making the original texts available for the inspection of others who may have other biases and prejudices. In insisting on the checkability of data, historical linguists are considerably ahead of the average descriptive linguist. The historian tries to bring us as close to his data as he can, while the descriptive linguist keeps us many times removed. Between the reader and the native speaker there are interposed the training, skills and theoretical orientation of the linguist; rarely is an effort made to bridge this gap by publishing tapes or protocols.
The chief methodological principle of historical linguistics remains the NEOGRAMMARIAN HYPOTHESIS:
every sound change, inasmuch as it occurs mechanically, takes place according to laws that admit no exception. That is, the direction of the sound shift is always the same for all the members of a linguistic community except where a split into dialects occurs; and all words in which the sound subjected to the change appears in the same relationship are affected by the change without exception.
(Osthoff & Brugmann 1878)
It is no longer possible to defend this hypothesis as a substantive claim that word classes actually do move intact and as a whole. Although the objections of nineteenth-century realists seemed to have been overwhelmed, decisive disproof has now been provided by Wang and his associates who have demonstrated the existence of lexical diffusion on a massive scale in the history of Chinese dialects (Chen & Hsieh '97I; Cheng & Wang 1970) . But as a methodological principle the neogrammarian hypothesis has been more successful: it has provided the basic incentive to search for regularity and underlying conditioning factors in sound change, rather than accept surface variation on face value. Unfortunately, most historical linguists felt it necessary to defend the neogrammarian hypothesis as a substantive description of the process of sound change, and this preoccupation brought them into conflict with the solid data of dialectologists. When Gauchat (1905) demonstrated that sound changes in Charmey proceeded across three generations by fluctuations and lexical oscillations, the neogrammarians rejected this and other descriptions of sound change in progress as mere 'dialect borrowing' (Goidanich I926; Bloomfield 1933: 36I). Yet given the imperfect character of historical records, it seems inevitable that we must rely on present data to interpret them. In fact, our current research on sound change in progress (Labov 197oa ) is based upon the UNIFORMITARIAN PRINCIPLE: the linguistic processes taking place around us are the same as those that have operated to produce the historical record.2
In weighing the limitations of the Uniformitarian Principle, we are forced to ask whether the growth of literacy and mass media are new factors affecting the course of linguistic change that did not operate in the past. But even if this should be so, we can still isolate in the patterns of everyday speech the kind of factors which have always operated on the spoken language and which determine the main stream of linguistic evolution in the present (Labov I966a) .
The mutual interpretation of past and present can be seen most clearly in the classical problem of the Great Vowel Shift. Current controversy and the historical evidence is summed up by Wolfe (I969). The traditional view of Jespersen and Wyld accepted the evidence of Hart and other sixteenth-century orthoepists on the route followed by the long vowels of English: in particular, that the diphthongized high vowel of die descended from [dii] to [dei] . But K6keritz, Dobson, Stockwell and others found it difficult to accept this view: for at the same time, the vowel of day rose from [dhei] to [dei]. Presumably the two would then have merged, but in fact they did not. The counterclaim was put forward (Stockwell I966) that die was first centralized and then fell from [di] to [dai], but there is little hard evidence to support this view. Our current instrumental studies of similar changes in progress show that in a wide range of dialects, the new high diphthong /iy/ in see falls to /ey/ as a front vowel -but not in the extreme front position typical of tense vowels. The nuclei of these falling diphthongs follow a centralized track which is clearly in the region of front vowels but with more moderate second formant positions. This view of current sound shifts cannot give us certain knowledge of what happened in the sixteenth century; but it can resolve the contradiction between theory and evidence summarized above. We now know that there is no reason to expect a merger of die and day, even if Middle English die followed the pattern of some current /iy/ vowels and fell to [dci] and then to [dai] .3 The two vowels can pass each other on the routes [2] The term 'uniformitarian' is borrowed from geology, where it signifies the now generally accepted principle of Hutton that processes now taking place around us -weathering, sedimentation, volcanism, etc. -are the same as those that have operated in the past to produce the geological record. [3] Even if local observers had reported that die and day were 'the same' at that time, it would not follow that they were in fact the same and would not prevent these word classes from following their opposing paths without disruption. Recent research on sound change in progress shows that native speakers do not perceive consistent secondformant differences which effectively separate word classes in natural speech. See Labov (I97oa) and below.
indicated in Figure i . In approaching this historical problem with very different kinds of data than that originally used, we converge upon the problem with different sources of error. Observations of current changes thus have a heightened value for the resolution of older problems, as indicated by the PRINCIPLE OF CONVERGENCE: the value of new data for confirming and interpreting old data is directly proportional to the differences in the methods used to gather it. The problem of interpreting literary texts, letters, puns and rhymes has two aspects: (I) determining the relation between the writing system and the spoken language, and (2) determining the relation between normative responses and the vernacular. The first problem has been explored and argued (Stockwell & Barritt I96I; Kuhn & Quirk 1953) but the second is still largely neglected. FIGURE I. Routes followed by falling (lap) nuclei and rising (tense) nuclei in sound changes in progress.
Elegant investigations might be carried out by comparing current novels, letters, puns, poems and dictionaries with the actual state of the language today, and so reflect backwards on the interpretation of earlier documents. This would require a joint effort of historical scholars and linguists working with natural speecha natural alliance, since these are the two branches of linguistics which are most concerned with controlling their data and searching out error.
ELICITATIONS
For many anthropologists, linguistics as a whole is essentially a methodological necessity. They learn language in order to enter the culture; if they report their knowledge in grammatical sketch, it is to preserve this aspect of the culture before it disappears, not for the sake of the general needs of linguistic theory. The anthropological linguist looks at the matter differently, more with an eye to the general problems of linguistics, but he also finds himself approaching the language from outside the grammar and the culture. He makes no claim on native intuition to defend his grammar, nor can he hope to seize the flow of natural conversation until long past the usual stages of language learning and reporting. Few anthropological linguists learn a language well enough to make much use of the conversational data of the street and the marketplace. The normal procedure is to transcribe texts -often traditional folk lore -to elicit translations of sentences from bilingual informants, present minimal pairs and ask for 'sames' and 'differents'. It would be idle to criticize these methods because they are limited; by such techniques, Boas and Sapir enriched tremendously the range of data available to a linguistic theory which had been largely based on texts and normative handbooks of a narrow group of European language families. Yet a calm view of our current field techniques should make it evident that this data is also normative, modified by conscious reflection and governed by cultural norms of right and wrong, good and bad language. Many American linguists assumed at first that such norms existed only in literary cultures, but in one of the most candid and penetrating examples of self-criticism on record, Bloomfield
showed how mistaken he had been in this respect. To the extent that there is a disjunction between norms and the pattern of everyday speech, the traditional field approach will yield a rough and necessarily imperfect first approach to the language. The minimal pair test or commutation test, long considered the soundest of all behavioral tests, is a dramatic example of this limitation. In our recent work on sound change in progress, we find that minimal pairs can be doubly defective. It has been observed before that native speakers can make distinctions in minimal pairs that they do not make in actual speech; normative responses often preserve fanciful, archaic or mythical distinctions. But it was not realized that native speakers can fail to recognize or register distinctions which they regularly make in natural speech (Labov 197oa ): their self-reports often reflect the patterns of younger speakers rather than their own, or blur regular phonetic distinctions that are too subtle to withstand the glare of conscious examination.
The chief methodological principle here is that the linguist must be fully aware of the nature of his data. A realistic methodology would not insist that he abandon all description until he can trade insults with the man in the street or dispute local theology in the full flood of an enlightened scepticism. But if the linguist recognizes the existence of these higher levels of competence, he can use his developing grasp of the language on second or third trips to the field to locate the differences between norms and behavior; by doing so, he would deepen the value of his original observations for an increasingly dynamic and secular linguistic theory.
The courses infield methods taught in our linguistics departments are of course quite domesticated; they are more garden variety than field. But their wellinformed informants provide students with their only serious practice in transcription and analysis. The exercises of our traditional texts are even more removed from the data of a secular linguistics, but the work they demand is honest work. To the everlasting credit of structural linguistics, it took the student seriously, and tried to give him all the help it could. Gleason (I96i), Pike (1947) and Nida (949) assumed that the student they were addressing was going to bring back some important data from the field, and they were anxious to teach him the essential skills of phonetic transcription, segmentation, allophonic grouping, recognition of conditioned variants, minimal pairs and commutation tests. The success of this approach is evident in the best of the California dissertations and SIL reports. However, the formal methodology which grew out of the structuralist tradition was alarmingly unrealistic. It fully deserved the criticism which Chomsky turned on 'discovery procedures'. Although it is hard for us to believe it today, a number of students took seriously the contention of Bloch and Harris that one could analyze a language by beginning at the phonetic level without reference to the meanings of the words.4 There was an unstated and informal methodological principle that gained currency and influenced practice which we can call the PRINCIPLE OF PREFERENTIAL IGNORANCE: the less the linguist knows about a language, the more accurate (objective? scientific?) his description will be. It is unlikely that the theory of ignorance will ever be fully developed, since the questions we ask today demand deep rather than shallow knowledge. But granted that the linguist could apply his technical skills of segmentation and classification in a reliable way, would the results be valid? What would a test of validity be in such a procedure?
The kind of methodology reflected in the discovery procedures of the I940S and 5os has little relation to the principles to be presented here. We do not see reflected therein the careful concern with sources of error, the search for new kinds of data, for convergent and confirming perspectives which is our concept of methodology.
At a number of points throughout this discussion the phrase 'sources of error' has been used, and it will be helpful to specify the kinds of error we are talking about. There are of course errors of measurement, of memory, or of calculation, all of which can be avoided by careful attention to procedures. Tests of reliability help us to check such errors and eliminate them. But we are more concerned with a different type of error which stems from a misapprehension of the nature of the data. The data which may be cited as evidence of some underlying construct such as a linguistic rule, when it may in fact be largely the product of many factors and represent no single property at all. If the errors of misapprehension or the contextual factors neglected are local (such as interaction with a particular interviewer) we will obtain a loss of reliability when others repeat the work. But if they are general (such as neglecting the tendency to report norms rather than behavior) we may obtain reproducible results which are still erroneous in their application to the theoretical problem. In order to detect and eliminate such results, we need tests of validity. Unfortunately, we do not find any concept of validity in the methodology developed by descriptive linguistics to elicit linguistic data. The seriousness of descriptive intent was offset by a fashionable and aimless relativism in theory. A simple, commonsense adherence to the search for intersubjective agreement will reject such defensive manoeuvers. It seems reasonable for anthropological linguists to be guided by the growing concern within anthropology to reduce the role of the observer and let their methods be as transparent as possible; and so arrange matters that their own training, skills, and limitations be cancelled in the final analysis. This is of course only a goal to be aimed at, not a practice to be achieved, but it reflects a definition of validity which we will explore in a later section: that our descriptions should apply to the language which was spoken before we arrive and will still be spoken after we leave.
INTUITIONS
There is no doubt that Chomsky is responsible for the most important methodological revolution in our field. He directed a withering criticism at the extreme behavioral approach which denied the existence of mental constructs and rejected intuitive evidence out of hand. Chomsky and his students have demonstrated the existence of a vast, seemingly inexhaustible supply of data which the linguist can draw from his own knowledge of language. The richness of the results is beyond dispute. We know much more about English, and about language in general than we knew before and this achievement will stand whether or not the current form of generative theory survives in a recognizable form.
The question remains as to whether generative grammar has any methodology beyond the decision to exploit intuitions of grammaticality to the full. To begin with, we should note that this strategy depends upon the successful exploitation of the SAUSSURIAN PARADOX. Saussure argued (I962: 321) that the linguist must concentrate upon the social aspect of language, langue, which is conceived as so general that it is in the possession of every speaker. It follows that one can investigate langue by asking anyone about it, even oneself, which is what Chomsky proceeded to do. On the other hand, the individual details of parole can be ascertained only through a social survey in the midst of the population. The SAUSSURIAN PARADOX, then, is that the social aspect of language can be studied through the intuitions of any one individual, while the individual aspect can be studied only by sampling the behavior of an entire population.
The development of generative grammar has brought about a steady enrich-ment of this intuitive data. Chomsky's early response to criticisms of the grammatical-ungrammatical opposition was to suggest an ordered scale of grammaticality (I96I), but in further developments each writer has followed his own bent. As judgments became more refined, several intermediate designations began to appear: in addition to ungrammatical '*', we observe questionable '?', questionably ungrammatical '?*', and outstandingly ungrammatical '**'. In addition, the kinds of intuitions to be cited as evidence were steadily enlarged.
The original judgments of grammaticality (well-formedness) naturally included, (2) judgments of ambiguity, and (3) judgments of correct paraphrase. But even from the outset we also note claims for (4), judgments of sameness or difference of sentence type, and (5) intuitions about immediate constituents (Chomsky I96I). A new emphasis on the theory of markedness has brought the citation of (6), native intuitions on marked and unmarked status. Finally, there are the most powerful of all kinds of intuition, (7) feelings that a given theory is the right one, or that another solution is 'counterintuitive'.
It is unfortunate that this proliferation of the intuitive data has not been accompanied by a methodological concern for the reduction of error, or a search for intersubjective agreement. The weaknesses of intuitive studies in this respect are known to all of us, but not everyone knows what to do about it without abandoning the advances we have made. Originally, Chomsky hoped that the area of agreement on judgments of grammaticality would be so large that the disputed areas could easily be resolved by following the general pattern. But this has not worked out in practice. The search for critical arguments has driven almost everyone to the use of examples which command no agreement at all. As one of countless examples, I cite Jackendoff's article on 'Quantifiers in English' (1968). Among the sentences given as grammatical without question we have The three of the men that you met yesterday have not left yet and Of the men, the three you met yesterday have not left yet. Chomsky himself has found it impossible to avoid arguments based on admittedly personal judgments. In his paper 'Remarks on nominalizations' (1970) he cites pairs such as our election of 7ohn (to the presidency) vs. *our election of John (to be) president and notes: 'Reactions to these sentences vary slightly: [these] represent my judgments.' He then adds, 'Given such data, . . ' and proceeds with the argument. By 'data' he does not mean the disagreements, but rather the evidence of his own decisions. As valuable and insightful as such arguments may be, they cannot alone lead to the sure sense of right and wrong that we have raised as our ultimate goal. To achieve intersubjective knowledge, we will probably have to limit ourselves to intuitions of types (I)-3) above, and refrain entirely from citing the intuitions of the theorist himself as evidence. Any serious consideration of sources of error must hold such data as the most suspect unless it coincides with other sources.
Nevertheless Given this degree of reliability, we must agree that the investigation of other peoples' intuitions is on a sound footing; at the same time, Carden recognizes that there is a problem of explaining and controlling the changes that occur. Other studies of informant judgments indicate that we are dealing with a statistical phenomenon, at least as usually carried out. The studies of grammatical acceptability by Quirk and his associates confirm our informal observations that it is rare to find IOO per cent agreement or disagreement on any sentence. Investigations of judgments on tag questions and other syntactic issues carried out by Lehiste and by Wedge & Ingemann (1970) showed that such data is variable and shifting in the extreme. We can find implicational relations within the flux of responses (see Elliott, Legum & Thompson 1969), if we are prepared for a certain number of irregularities. There may be emerging a whole new calculus of variations in the study of intuitive judgments. However, there has been no success so far in replicating regular patterns in such variation (Postal I968; Labov 197ob , and Heringer's disagreement with Carden I968). In general we must observe that it is the nature of language to produce categorical judgments, and we should not forget that it is usually the difficult and disputed areas that have been investigated. But when we enter variable areas, it appears that intuitive judgments are less regular than behavior. We seem to move quickly I07 from regular areas of social agreement (langue) to a region of intuitive parole. It seems clear that a great many disputes in generative grammar do revolve about an area of idiosyncratic behavior where the social compact has disappeared. For rare sentence types, it is only natural that each individual should have to solve the problem for himself; in so far as he can do this by extending his current roles in a predictable manner, we are dealing with langue; in so far as individuals diverge without any observable pattern, we are dealing with true idiolects. The very concept of idiolect, of course, represents a defeat for the Saussurian notion of langue as the general possession of the speech community. Our general aim is to write the grammar of that speech community, with all of its internal variation, style shifting, change in progress (Weinreich, Labov & Herzog I968). When the data begins to fragment into unpatterned idiosyncrasies -for normative judgments for actual behavior -then linguistics comes to a stop. This is not the kind of data that we can rely on for a theory of language that would satisfy the least of Saussure's ambitions.
OBSERVATIONS
There is obviously something odd in placing observations last in the types of data used by linguists. But the observation of natural speech is in fact the most difficult of all the methods discussed so far. Texts, elicitations and intuitions are much more accessible, more easily segmented and classified; yet the wealth of linguistic description and theory which has been built upon such data still remains to be interpreted in its relation to language as a vehicle of communication in everyday life. In the gathering of elicitations and intuitions, there is no obvious sense in which the work can be described as valid. If another linguist obtains the same judgments from native speakers or from his own introspections, then we can say that the method is reliable. But reliability by itself does not help us in developing a sound theory of language in the sense that we intend. Very often the linguist is actually producing his own phenomena.5 He has therefore created a further problem of relating these artifacts to natural language.
What would it mean for elicitations or intuitions to be valid? One might io8 reasonably demand that they match the language of everyday life used when the linguist is not present. This demand follows from the fact that there are very few linguists and there are many speakers, an observation which might be formalized as the PRINCIPLE OF THE VOCAL MAJORITY: many speak but few elicit. Therefore if our theories are merely the artifacts of our own analyzing activity, they will have little to tell us about the natural evolution of language. Either our theories are about the language that ordinary people use on the street, arguing with friends, or at home blaming their children, or they are about very little indeed.
Those who gather literary texts are actually observing something which was produced independently: historical linguists are certainly engaged in the observation of language. Some believe that the full structure of language can only be observed in its most literary developments, and that speech is relatively impoverished. However, we retain the conviction of our predecessors in American linguistics that texts can be understood only in their relation to the spoken language -that the main stream of evolution of language is to be found in everyday speech, even in highly literary cultures such as our own.
In order to introduce observations from everyday life, we have to carry out a thorough-going criticism of beliefs and ideology more or less as Chomsky did for the methodology of the Bloomfieldians. One widely propagated belief which is used to discourage the study of ordinary language is that speech is incoherent. Chomsky has often remarked that the child must discard the largest part of what he hears as ungrammatical (I965: 58). This view is a myth based upon no evidence at all, except perhaps a few transcripts of learned conferences. Anyone who works with natural speech realizes this, and it has been shown systematically that the majority of sentences spoken by ordinary people are well-formed without any editing; all but a tiny percentage can be reduced to that form by the use of simple and universal editing rules (Labov I966b).
Secondly, we find that most investigators describe their own community as exceptional, rife with dialect mixture and chaotic variation as compared to the homogeneous nature of traditional speech communities. But such homogeneous communities are also myths. As Gauchat showed (1905), even the most remote Swiss village shows systematic variation across sex and age group. More recent investigations of speech communities in New England, New York City, Detroit, Hillsboro, Salt Lake City, and Norwich show that this variation follows regular patterns which tell us a great deal about the evolution of language as well as how people use it. We find again and again that the grammar of a speech community is more regular than the behavior of the individual ( We find a third ideological barrier in the claim that all such data belong to some other far-away discipline called the study of performance, to be realized when we have mastered the facts of competence. The distinction between competence and performance may have its uses, but as it is now drawn it is 9og almost incoherent. If performance factors are those which facilitate or impede the production of sentences, then almost all of our transformational apparatus would fall under that rubric: rules of extraposition, complementation, particle movement, negative attraction, and so on. We begin with a multi-dimensional deep structure, impossible to perform, and end with a linear organization that is easy to say and to grasp. Instead of the left-embedded For anyone to do that is a shame, we extrapose, and say It's a shame for anyone to do that; we then perform with greater ease a right-embedded complement as a result of this extraposition.
There are also technical innovations which facilitate the study of everyday speech. The magnetic tape recorder was introduced to this country just after World War II. But most linguists have been slow to admit its importance, continuing to claim that data jotted down in person is more reliable than a tape recording. Most linguistic students in graduate departments have access to an aged Wollensak, if that, and have gotten no grasp of the difficult art of making good recordings. It would be fair to say that a lack of professional orientation towards equipment has been a serious impediment in the development of the study of language in everyday life. The only serious relation to instrumentation is found among phoneticians, and the general impression holds that good recordings are important only in the laboratory. But in actual fact, much better recording techniques are needed for the study of grammar than for phonology, even better equipment is needed for the analysis of discourse in ordinary interaction. 6 The strongest constraints that prevent linguists from utilizing the wealth of linguistic data with which they are surrounded are the barriers against interaction with strangers in one's own culture. The most common question addressed to me after a lecture involving data drawn from speakers outside the university is: 'What do you say to these people?' This is a legitimate and important question. But before we can answer it, we must recognize the nature of the problem: the unnamed and unspecified fears that these strangers will somehow do us harm. Each person is secretly convinced that he alone is fearful and isolated. To protect themselves against accusations of incapacity, neglect or cowardice, many academic people manufacture a counter-ideology: maintaining that these other people outside the university passionately want to be left alone; that it is immoral There are personality differences among linguists which will inevitably lead to specialization in the library, bush, street or closet. But it seems to me that one must resist the tendency to redefine the limits of linguistics to suit one's own personality. We see this tendency in the historian's rejection of spoken texts, the structuralist's rejection of intuitions, the intuitionist's rejection of everyday speech, and the anthropologist's rejection of his own society.
Our first steps in the study of everyday life allow us to say something about the crucial question of validity for elicitations and intuitions. Under what conditions do normative responses diverge from behavior? Under what conditions can we ask direct questions about grammaticality and obtain responses related to the language which is used in ordinary communication? On the whole, we cannot do this with young children, although Lila Gleitman has demonstrated the extraordinary capacity of certain children as grammarians (I970).
The dialect used by children is only one of many non-standard dialects which are in contact with a dominant standard. Given such a condition, we can assert a general PRINCIPLE OF SUBORDINATE SHIFT: When speakers of a subordinate dialect are asked direct questions about their language, their answers will shift in an irregular manner toward [or away from] the superordinate dialect. This principle operates whenever we try to study the rules of working-class dialect, Black English, patois or creole using formal elicitation or training native speakers to ask themselves questions. That is not to say that such activities should not or cannot be carried on; but in the absence of any other data, one must expect that the results will be invalid in a number of unspecified and unforeseeable ways.8 Granted the ability to pass beyond ideological, technical, and social constraints, and the recognition of the disjunctions between norms and behavior, there remains a crucial methodological paradox in the study of everyday language. It follows from five principles which have been discussed elsewhere (Labov I 97ob), and will be stated here quite briefly.
First is the PRINCIPLE OF STYLE SHIFTING: there are no single-style speakers. Whenever we first encounter a speaker in a face-to-face situation, we must assume that we are observing only a limited part of his entire linguistic repertoire. There may be some linguistic features that do not shift from one style to another, but every speaker will have a configuration of linguistic variables that shift from one context to another.
The PRINCIPLE OF ATTENTION asserts that Styles can be ordered along a single dimension, measured by the amount of attention paid to speech. Despite the varied nature of stylistic influences, and the multi-dimensional character of stylistic rules, all of the patterns can be projected on a single ordered dimension which has significance for our methodology. Casual and intimate styles can be stationed at one end of this continuum, and frozen, ritualistic styles at the other. At present we can control some of the factors which cause attention to be paid to speech (see below), but we have not yet quantified the actual behavioral feature: attention to or monitoring of speech.9
The third in this series is the VERNACULAR PRINCIPLE: that the style which is most regular in its structure and in its relation to the evolution of the language is the vernacular, in which the minimum attention is paid to speech. To justify this principle fully would require a review of a large body of sociolinguistic data from a great many sources (but see in particular Labov I966: xIv). This principle can also be seen to follow quite naturally from the PRINCIPLE OF THE VOCAL MAJORITY cited above. It is the high frequency and practiced automaticity of everyday language which is responsible for its pervasive and well-formed character. The word 'vernacular' has sometimes led to the misunderstanding that this principle focuses only upon illiterate or lower-class speech. Most of the speakers of any social group have a vernacular style, relative to their careful and literary forms of speech. This most spontaneous, least studied style is the one that we as linguists will find the most useful as we place the speaker in the overall pattern of the speech community.
It can readily be seen that the fourth principle interferes with the third. The played in their spontaneous performance (Brown 1971) . Observations of language in use were first developed in this field, and recent advances in the semantic interpretations of children's language have utilized close attention to the behavioral context of speech (Bloom 1970 ).
[9] Methods for quantifying attention have been developed by Broadbent (I962), but such experimental techniques have not yet been applied to measure the amount of attention paid to speech.
PRINCIPLE OF FORMALITY states that any systematic observation of a speaker defines a formal context in which more than the minimum attention is paid to speech. By 'systematic observation', we include more than the presence or absence of a human observer. The tape recorder itself has a variable but persistent effect in shifting speech towards the formal end of the spectrum. We are then left with THE OBSERVER'S PARADOX: To obtain the data most important for linguistic theory, we have to observe how people speak when they are not being observed. The various solutions to this paradox define the methodology for the study of language in context. This methodology can be presented in the form of a brief history of sociolinguistic methods. The point of departure is the traditional practice of dialectology, in which the main concern is to elicit relatively small pieces of lexical or morphological information. This implies a long question from the interviewer and a short answer from the subject -just the opposite of our present practice which limits any question to a maximum of five seconds. But the early interviews in Martha's Vineyard (Labov I963) [iI]
Such methods are similar to the techniques used by anthropologists in forming questions which reflect the categories and vocabulary of the native culture (Black & Metzger I965). But the extreme formality which has been used in the approaches reported so far may give misleading results if there is a significant disjunction between norms and behavior. tion than was contained in it. When the speaker does give more, it is a gift, drawn from some general fund of good will that is held in trust by himself and the field worker. A deep knowledge implies a deep interest, and in payment for that interest the speaker may give more than anyone has a right to expect. Thus the field worker who can tap the full linguistic competence of his subjects must acquire a detailed understanding of what he is asking about, as well as broad knowledge of the general forms of human behavior.
Beyond the interview. The individual interview will remain as the foundation of our investigations, since only there do we control the large bulk of speech and the complex structures needed for the study of grammar. But the methods just described for overriding the constraints of the formal interview are only substitutes for the real thing, and give us only fragments of the vernacular.
A more systematic approach to recording the vernacular of everyday life is to allow the interaction of natural peer group itself to control the level of language produced. The techniques used here are from the original work done by Gumperz in Hemnes, Norway (I964) where he recorded the interaction of closed and open networks of members of the community. The investigators provide the initial setting, but gradually recede from the situation; the effect of recording is never wholly absent, as our principles would predict, but it is largely overridden by other factors -the same as those which operate in everyday life. Such techniques were further developed in our work with adolescent peer groups in South Central Harlem (Labov, Cohen, Robins & Lewis I968: I, 57). Though group sessions give us the basic standard by which we can calibrate our other work, they do not usually provide us with enough linguistic data on each individual. It is possible to feed back some of the same interactive mechanism to interviews with one or two speakers, if the interviewers are members of the same community. There are great differences in the techniques available to insiders, in the quality of interaction, and in the type of information obtained, as compared to the best interviews done by outsiders. Insiders cut deeper; but at the same time, they are more limited in the range of speakers they can deal with. Since they have a fixed location within the community, many members cannot speak to them as freely as they would to a stranger. Narratives told to insiders tend to be more fragmentary, less well-formed than those told to outsiders. The outsider can be seen as a blunt instrument, a useful tool for all kinds of rough work, while the insider can penetrate more deeply in a narrower range. No serious study of a speech community should be planned without including both kinds of investigators from the outset.
The kind of long-term observation just described would be most important in studies of the acquisition of language. No such studies have been carried out yet with a natural play group as the focus; the family has been the only target of attention. Within that matrix, there has been considerable progress in the kinds of observations that have been made, with increasing attention paid to the This conversation then continued for another five minutes without any intervention of the interviewer. Bill and Henry Sr engaged in a long argument on which was harder work-using a sledge hammer in the old days, or using a pneumatic hammer today. The family members put themselves on display, showing us their immediate concerns, their mode of argument, their system of values, and the grammatical structure of their everyday language.
As we move away from the individual interview, our data is less complete, but closer to the language of everyday life. Another step in that direction can be taken through RAPID AND ANONYMOUS OBSERVATIONS. Here we may know very little about the speakers, but we can observe a great many of them, and the effect of the interview situation is nil. The survey of (r) in New York City department stores (Labov I966a: III) provides one such model, and others have been developed in work with the telephone, asking directions, or street corner observation. More recently we have used such techniques to observe the use of Spanish on Harlem streets and check the birth place of those who use the language there. Such rapid and anonymous studies have built-in sources of error, but the error is complementary with that of interviews. When the two kinds of data converge, we have in effect partialled out the effect of experimental and observational error.
There remains a residual and almost insoluble problem -the rarity of many grammatical forms. It will no doubt always be necessary to extend our observations with intuitions. Yet we are only beginning to learn how to enrich the data of natural conversation by minimal intervention. When we fully understand the use of a given grammatical form, we are then able to elicit it in conversation without using it ourselves, and without seeming to do anything odd or artificial. This has been done only for a small number of items, such as the preterit, the passive, the future, and present perfect, and relative clauses. In general, we can say that the future study of language in context will depend heavily upon the development of means of enriching the data of natural conversation.
CONVERGENCE
This discussion has been limited to the methodology involved in gathering linguistic data. A second paper of equal length is needed to deal with the methods used in analysis. In such a discussion, we would be able to review the more detailed evidence which supports the Vernacular Principle -that the most systematic style is that used when the minimum attention is paid to speech. We would also consider the ways in which different methods can be mutually confirming. In pages Io5-Io8, we noted that the study of intuitions has not achieved this kind of convergence, and it seems unlikely that the current explorations of variation and implications in intuitive judgments will yield that kind of result. (Labov 197ob) . If this agreement has been achieved it is because attention was given to possible sources of error in each study. The most effective way in which convergence can be achieved is to approach a single problem with different methods, with complementary sources of error. A number of the studies cited have used observations, intuitions, elicitations, texts and experiments to achieve this result. Here we must refer again to the PRINCIPLE OF CONVERGENCE: the value of new i i8 data for confirming and interpreting old data is directly proportional to the differences in the methods used to gather it.
Despite the fact that we have a variety of methodological approaches, the unity of linguistics is not hard to conceive. It is not necessary for everyone to use the same methods -indeed, it is far better if we do not. Otherwise we would not benefit from the complementary principle. The unification of linguistics must necessarily proceed from the understanding of linguists that the field need not be defined to fit their personal style, but can expand to a broad attack on the complexity of the problem. Data from a variety of distinct sources and methods, properly interpreted, can be used to converge on right answers to hard questions.
